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Abstract
In this paper we consider the computation of Nash equilibria for
noncooperative bi-matrix games. The standard method for finding a Nash
equilibrium in such a game is the Lemke-Howson method. That method ope-
rates by solving a related linear complementarity problem (LCP). However,
the method may fail to reach certain equilibria because it can only start
from a limited number of strategy vectors. The method we propose here
Finds an equilibrium by solving a related stationary point problem (SPP).
Cc~i~trai~y to the Lemke-ííowson method it can start from any strategy vector.
Besides, the path of vectors along which the equilibrium is reached has an
appealing game-theoretic interpretation. An important feature of the algo-
rithm is that it finds a perfect equilibrium when at the start all actions
are played with positive probability. Furthermore we can in principle find
all Nash equilibria by repeated application of the algorithm starting from
different strategy vectors.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of finding Nash equilibria
in mixed strategies for a noncooperative bi-matrix game. A noncooperative
bi-matrix game is a two-person game with a finite set of actions for each
player. The payoffs of a player are listed in a matrix. The Nash equili-
brium is the standard equilibrium concept for a noncooperative game. It
states that a strategy is an equilibrium strategy when no player can im-
prove upon his situation by deviating from his strategy while all other
players keep on playing their strategies.
The standard method for solving a bi-matrix game is the Lemke-
Howson method (see [3]). That method finds a Nash equilibrium by solving a
related linear complementarity problem (LCP), which is not defined on the
strategy space but on a nonnegative orthant. Each solution then uniquely
determines an equilibrium on the strategy space.
The method proposed in this paper finds a Nash equilibrium by
solving a stationary point problem (SPP) on the strategy space. Thus,
contrary to the Lemke-Howson procedure it directly operates on the strate-
gy space. Both methods are complementary pivoting algorithms and therefore
find a positively indexed equilibrium (see [57). However, because the
choice of the starting vector for the Lemke-Howson procedure is restric-
ted, that method may fail to reach certain positively indexed equilibria.
In our method the choice oF the starting vector is free and therefore we
can find in principle all positively indexed equilibria by a repeated
application of our algorithm from several starting vectors. However, the
problem whích remains is to find suitable starting vectors.In this paper
we also show how our algorithm can find negatively indexed equilibria by
restarting from the positively indexed equilibria already found. Our me-
thod can be seen as a strategy adjustment process having an appealing
game-theoretic interpretation. In this respect it is also interesting that
the algorithm finds a perfect equilibrium whenever the starting vector
lies in the interior of the strategy space, i.e. when at the start all
actions are played with a positive probability.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we show
that the set of Nash equilibria in a bi-matrix game can be seen as the3
solution set of a stationary point problem. Our solution procedure is
YL'eJeÍltGU 1 J. a-n Scction ~ In Sertinn 4 we prove the perfectness of the equi-
librium found by the procedure when starting from a strategy vector in the
interior of the strategy space. In Section 5 we show how our algorithm can
find negatively indexed equilibria. We also illustrate in an example that
our method can find more equilibria than the Lemke-Howson method. Finally,
some remarks are made concerning the computational speed of both algo-
rithms.
2. Solving the bi-matrix game as a stationary point problem
A bi-matrix game is a tuple (n1,n2,A,B) in which nl(n2) denotes
the number of pure strategies of player 1(2) while A(B) is the payoff
matrix of player 1(2). The pure strategies of player 1(2) are indexed by
(l,k), k-1,...,n1, ((2,k), k-1,...,n2). The matrices A and B have dimen-
sion nl x n2. An element ajk of A denotes the payoff to player 1 if he
plays his j-th pure strategy while player 2 plays his k-th pure strategy.
Similarly, bjk denotes the payoff of player 2 in that situation.
The strategy space of player j, j-1,2, is defined as the (nj-1)-
n.-1 n, n
dimensional unit simplex S ~ .- {xjER}~I~k~lxjk - 1}. A vector xj in
n.-1
S~ , j-1,2, represents the mixed strategy of player j at which he plays
n.-1
his k-th pure strategy with probability xjk. T'he nj vertices of S~ are
n.
the unit vectors in R~. They correspond to the pure strategies of player
nl-1 n2-1
j, j-1,2. The strategy space of the game, S, is equal to S x S . A
vector x in S is called a strategy vector and is equal to (xl,x2) with
nl-1 n2-1
x1ES and x2ES . Each vertex of S corresponds to a strategy vector
at which both players play a pure strategy. The set S being the product of
two unit simplices is called a simplotope.
On the set S we define the function z: S~ Rnl x Rn2 as follows.
nl
For each x in S the vector z(x) -(zl(x),z2(x)) with zl(x) E R , z2(x) E
n
R 2, is defined by
21(X) - AX2 and Z2(X) - BTX1. (2.1)4
The element zlk(x), k-1,...,n1, is the payoff to player 1 when he plays
his k-th pure straroo-., ;~h;la playar 2 olays x~. Similarly, z2k(x), k-1, ~pJ - - - L
...,n2, is the payoff to player 2 when he plays his j-th pure strategy
while player 1 plays xl. The number x~z~(x) is the expected payoff to
player j, j-1,2, when the strategy vector x is played.
A strategy vector xN in S is called a Nash equilibrium if
n.-1
x~zj(x~) 5 x~TZj(xN) , xj E S ~ ,j-1,2. (2.2)
Thus, deviating from x~ will not increase the expected payoff to player j.
The problem of finding an x~ in S such that x' satisfies (2.2) is known as
the stationary point problem (SPP) on S w.r.t. z. Since x~zj(xM) is linear
n.-1
in xj we can restrict ourselves in (2.2) to the nj vertices of S ~ , j-
M
1,2, so that x~ in S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if zjk(x~) 5 xjT
zj(x"), k-1,...,nj, j-1,2. From this it is straightforward to derive that
x" is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all k, k-1,...,nj,
zjk(x~) maxhzjh(x~`) when x~k ) 0, j-1,2. (2.3)
Thus, at a Nash equilibrium only actions that are optimal for a player are
played with positive probability.
Notice that at a Nash equilibrium xN the expected payoff to player j is
equal to maxhzjh(x`) since zjk(x~) ~ maxhzjh(x~) implies x~k - 0.
3. The procedure
In this section we describe an algorithm for finding a solution to
the SPP as given in (2.3). Starting From an arbitrarily chosen strategy
vector v-(vl,v2) in S, the algorithm generates a piecewise linear path
of points in S leading from v to a Nash equilibrium. More precisely,
points x-(xl,x2)ES on the path generated by the algorithm satisfy the
following conditions. For k-1,...,n1,
xik - b(x,v).vlk if zlk(x) C maxhzlh(x)
xlk 2 b(x,v).vlk if zlk(x) - maxhzlh(x),5
while for k-1,...,n,,, ~
x2k - b(x,v).v2k if z2k(x) ( maxhz2h(x)
x2k 2 b(x,v).v2k if z2k(x) - maxhz2h(x)'
x.h




Observe that x- v satisfies (3.1) with b(x,v) - 1. Also each
Nash-equilibrium xM satisfies (3.1) with b(xN,v) - 0 or with vjk - 0 if
zjk(x~) ~ maxhzjh(xM)~ In the latter case the non-optimal actions are
already played with probability zero at the start. In both cases x~k -
b(xw,v). vjk is equal to zero if (j,k) is a non-optimal action at x'.
Under some non-degeneracy condition the set of poínts satisfying (3.1)
contains a piecewise linear path, P, from v to a Nash equilibrium. This
path will be followed by the algorithm. The notion of non-degeneracy will
be made precise further on, but is is for example required that at x- v
both maxkzlk(x) and max~z2~(x) are attained for a unique index. Thus, at
the starting strategy vector v each player has only one optimal action.
Suppose these maxima are attained for the actions (l,kl) and (2,k2) re-
spectively. Clearly, from v, along P, b(x,v) must decrease from 1. Thus,
according to (3.1), initially vectors x in S are generated such that all
the xlk, k~ kl, and x2k, k~ k2, are relatively decreased
(xik -
b(x,v)vik, (i,k) ~(l,kl),(2,k2)), while both xlk and x2k are increased
nl-1 n2-1 1 2
in order to keep xl in S and x2 in S . This is done till b(x,v)
becomes 0 and a Nash equilibrium is reached, or till a point x is reached
at which zjk(x) - zjk (x) for some (j,k), k~ kj. Then xjk is also relati-
J
vely increased. In general the algorithm generates strategy vectors x such
that elements xjk~vjk, related to the indices (j,k) for which zjk(x) ~
maxhzjh(x), are minimal. As soon as one of these components of z(x), say
zjk(x), becomes equal to maxhzjh(x), then x~k~vjk is increased. On the
other hand, if a vector x is generated such that xjk~vjk with z~k(x) -
maxhzjh(x) becomes minimal, i.e. equsl to b(x,v), then vectors y are gene-
rated with the (j,k)-th component equal to b(y,v)vjk and zjk(y) (
maxhzjh(y). The latter guarantees convergence to an equilibrium.6
To illustrate the foregoing let us provide a simple example of a
game in which both players have two pure strategies and the matrices n ái,d
B are given by
A- I-i 3J
and B- I2 -4J
.
The strategy space for this game is equal to S- S1 x S1 -{xER4~xi1
}
x12 - 1 and
x21 . x22 - 1}, and is displayed in Figure 3.1.
1~~,0),iu,l)) ~ -- ~(0.1).~0,1))
Figure 3.1. The path P of points satisfying (3.1) from v to a Nash equili-
brium.
Consider the starting point v-((~,~),(2,2)). It is straightforward to
verify that z(v) -((2,1),(~, 8)). Thus at v, zll(v) and z22(v) are maxi-
mal. So, the algorithm leaves v in the direction of ((1,0),(0,1)), i.e.
xll and x22 are both increased. The algorithm continues in this way till
2 4 16 11 22 22 the vector
a-((9'9)'(9'9))
is reached at which z(a) -(( 9' 9)'( 9' 9))'
i.e. at x- a, z21(x) hss become equal to z22(x). Observe that along thesegment (v,a) the number b(x,v) decreases from 1 to 9. Next the algorithm
continues, according to (3.1), by increasing x21 relatively away f'rom
x12
while keeping z21(x) equal to z22(x). It is easy to verify that the latter
holds along the line segment ( e,c). In fact, z21(x) - z22(x) - 2? if x -
9 11
2 2 ~ 4 20 7 22 22 9. At
c-((9,9),(9,9))
with z(c) - (( 9 ,9),( 9, 9)) we sti11 have z21(c)
- z22(c) and zll(c) ~ z12(c). But observe that at x- c, ~?2 has become
22
equal to b(x,v) - ~12 - 9. When keeping z22(x) equal to z21(x) one would
12
have to generate points x with x?2 C x12
which contradicts ( 3.1). In that
~22 ~12
case one would leave S at the vector ((9,9),(1,0)). But instead the algo-
rithm continues by keeping x22 relatively minimal while, according to
(3.1), z22(x) is decreased from maxhz2h(x) - z21(x). In this way the algo-
rithm reaches the vertex ((1,0),(1,0)) which is a pure Nash equilibrium
with z((1,o),(1,0)) - ((4,-i),(4,-3)).
The idea behind the procedure is to generate a sequence of vectors
x along which the set T of actions (j,k) for which zjk(x) - maxhzjh(x)
grows while the probabilities related to the other strategies are driven
down to zero, since if they are zero, a Nash-equilibrium is found, as
follows from (2.3). However, the set T does not need to grow monotonically
(cf. point c in the foregoing example). This guarantees the convergence of
the algorithm to a Nash equilibrium.
We now rewrite (3.1) into a form suited for implementing the algo-
rithm. By substituting (2.1) we obtain that the process generates from v
the piecewise linear path P of strategy vectors xES satisfying for
k-1.....n1.
xlk - bvlk if Akx2 ~ ~1
xlk Z bvlk if Akx2 -~1,
and for k-1,...,n2, (3,2)
x2k - bv2k if
x1Bk ~ ~2
x2k 2 bv2k if xiBk - S2,8
.,;hcro h.- hlY,vl, Ck and C, respectively the k-th row and k-th column of a
- - K
matri.x C, ~I - maxkAkx2, and p2 - maxkxiBk.
Before going further we introduce some additional notation. The set of
pure strategies of player j is denoted by I(j), j- 1,2. Thus, Z(j) -
{(j,l),...,(j,nj)}. The set I- I(1) u I(2) denotes the set of all pure
strategies in the game. For each x in (3.2) there is at least one set T C
I such that xjk Z bvjk and zjk(x) - pj for all (j,k) E T while zih(x) S pi
and xih - bvih for all (i,h) ~ T. From this observation we obtain that the
procedure generates for a sequence of subsets T of I with Tj:- T n I(j) ~
(b, starting at x- v, strategy-vectors x in S such that
xlk - bvlk and Akx2 5 pl if (l,k) f~ T
xlk 2 bvlk and Akx2 - pl if (l,k) E T,
and (3.3)
x2k - bv2k and xiBk s g2 if (2,k) fC T
x2k 2 bv2k and xiBk - p2 if (2,k) E T.
We now show how the piecewise linear path P from v to a Nash equilibrium
is generated by a sequence of linear programming (~.p) pivot steps in a
system of linear equations obtained from (3.3). Denote the set of points x
satisfying (3.3) for certain T C I by B(T). Thus, the algorithm reaches a
Nash equilibrium via a(finite) sequence of sets B(T), T C I. Each nonemp-
ty B(T) is a line segment and we need one ~.p step to follow such a B(T).
The system of linear equations in which the .~.p pivot step is made is
obtained from (3.3) by introducing slack variables for each inequality.
The slack variables for the inequalities Ahx2 5 pl, (l,h) !~ T, are denoted
by ulh and those for xi Bh 5 S2, (2,h) ~ T, by u2h. The slack variables
for the inequalities xjk 2 bvjk, (j,k) E T, are denoted by ~jk. Adding
these slacks to (3.3) we obtain that x belongs to B(T) iff there exist Ajk





~(j,k)ETj~jk - 1-b, (3.4)9
while
and
~2 ; ~(l,h)iCT ulhel(h) - el~l
T
B
xl } ~(2,h)í~T x2he2(h) - e2~2'
n.
Here ej(k) is the k-th unit vector in R ~ while ej is the vector of ones
n
in R j, j-1,2.
Substituting (3.4) in (3.5) gives the system of linear equations
Av2 0





Alc el ( h)
~ ' ~(l,h)~T uih ~
0 0
1 0
0 el 0 0
} ~(2.h)~I' ~2h e2(h) - ~1 0 - ~2 e2 - 0 . (3.6)
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
where 0 denotes a vector of zeros of appropriate length. In the system
(3.6) there are nl . n2 . 2 equations and nl t n2 ~ 3 variables. The last
two equations of (3.6) reflect the property that ~ ~ - 1-b
(j.k)ETj jk . J-
1,2. These equations can be eliminated by substituting for j-1,2 one of
the ~jk's, say ~jk , by
j





Let T~ be the set of indices defined by T~ - Tj`{(j,kj)} and let T1 - Ti u
T2. All this, together with substitutíng b by 1-b', gives the following
system of equations,10
~--k- - Av2 1 p l (Ak - Ak21
. L c ~ I ~ I I b gk - BTVlI . L(l,k)~1 ~lk Bk - Bk ; ~(2,k)E.I,1 ~2k 0
1 J l 1~ ~ ~
el(h)l 0 e
} ~(l,h)f~T Hlh 0 I ; ~(2,h)~T ~2h e2(h) - ~1 0 J ( ~ ~~
- S2le~J - l-BTV1J
(3.8)
The latter system has only nltn2 equations and nltn2tl variables, and the
variables must satisfy ~~k 2 0, (j,k)ET1, ~
1~ k 5 b', j-1,2, 0 s
(J,k)ET~ J
b' S 1, k 2 0, (j,h)íCT. A solution to this system is denoted by (b' ~, ~ ' 1
~2.u1,g2,~1,IB2). The ~.p pivot steps of the algorithm are made in system
(3.8).
We first consider the system ( 3.8) at the starting point x- v,
assuming that the point v is not a Nash equilibrium vector. At v the index
set T is equal to TO -{(l,kl),(2,k2)} with kl and k2 the ( unique) indices
for which
Akiv2 - maxkAkv2 and viBk - maxkviBk.
2
The corresponding solution of (3.8) is b' - 0, Klh -~1 - Ahv2 for h~ kl,
k
u2h ~ p2 - viBh for h~ k2, R1 - A iv2, and g2 - viBk2.
The algorithm leaves v by increasing b' from zero. According to (3.7) this
means that ~ik and ~2k are increased from zero. Recall that this was
1 2
just what happened in the example in the beginning of this section. In
this way the algorithm follows B(TO) by making an ~.p pivot step in (3.8)
with b'. As a result of this pivot step either b' becomes equal to one or
~ih
becomes zero for some (unique) index (i,h) Q T. In the latter case
zih
becomes equal to zik and the algorithm continues by making a linear pro-
i
gramming pivot step in (3.8) by increasing ~ih from zero in order to fol-
low the linear piece B(TO u{(i,h)}).
However, if v~k - 0 for all 0 (j,k) Q T u{(i,h)} the algorithm terminates
at the Nash equilibrium x-(xl,x2), where x~ -(1-b')v~ t b'e~(k~),11
j-1,2. In the case that b' becomes one, i.e. b- 0, the algorithm stops at
the pure Nash equilibrium x-(el(kl),e2(k2jj. '1'hese observations foll~:a
from (2.3).
In general, the algorithm generates the linear piece B(T) of the path P by
making a linear programming pivot step in (3.8). We assume that for each
such T at most one constraínt on the variables is binding at a solution of
(3.8).
Assumption 3.1. (nondegeneracy assumption). At each solution
(b',~1,~2,x1,
x2,~1,~2)
of (3.8) at most one of the constraints 0 5 b' S 1, ~jk 2 0 for
1 ,
(j,k) E T, b 2~~`jk' xih 2 0 for (i,h) ~ T, is binding.
k~k .
J
Assumption 3.1 is standard in linear programming. It assures that no more
than one variable becomes zero at the same time. For example, it is not
allowed that along the path several strategies become optimal simulta-
neously.
Furthermore, the solution set of (3.8) is bounded since Tj is nonempty for
j-1,2. Indeed, since pj - maxkzjk(x) and z is a continuous function on the
compact set S, pj must be finite and therefore also the Hih with (i,h) fC
T. This together with Assumption 3.1 and the linearity of z, implies that
the solution set of (3.8) for each T is eíther empty or a line segment
with two endpoints. At each endpoint exactly one of the constraints is
binding while no constraint is binding at interior solution points. The
line segment of solutions to (3.8) corresponds according to (3.4) and
(3.5) to B(T). The algorithm moves from one endpoint to the other by re-
laxing the constraint that is binding at the first endpoint. The other
endpoint is reached when another constraint becomes binding. More precise-
ly, at that other endpoint,
(b'.A1'~2'K1'p2'~1'~2)' the following cases
can happen
i) b' - 1
ii) ~jk - 0 for some (j,k) E T1
iii) ~ ~ s b' for some j E{1,2}
(j.k) E T~ ~k
iv) uih - 0 for some (i,h) fC T.12
In case i) and in case iv) when additionally vjk - 0 for all (j,k) ~ T u
{(i,h)}, the point x as defined in (3.4) is a Nash solution. In case iii
the corresponding strategy vector x-(xl,x2), being an endpoint of B(T),
is also an endpoint of B(T`{(j,k)}). The algorithm then follows the line
segment B(T`{(j,k)}) by increasing the complementary variable ujk from
zero in (3.8). Case iii) implies, according to (3.7), that ~jk s 0 and
3
can therefore be seen as a special case of ii). Thus the related vector x
is also an endpoint of B(T`{(j,kj)}). In order to follow this line segment
we have to adapt system (3.8) by eliminating another Ajk. In principle any
ajk, (j,k) E Tj`{(j,kj)}, can be taken. We suggest to take the largest
~jk, say ~j~. Thus we then substitute ~j~ by b' -~(j~h) E TjAjh'
h~kj ,,~
This substitution can easily be performed in (3.8) by adding the column
related to aj~ to the column related to b' and subtracting the same column
from the columns relsted to ~jh, h~.i. The algorithm continues with this
new system by increasíng pjk from zero in order to follow B(T`{(j,kj)}).
j
Finally, if in case iv) the corresponding vector x is not a Nash equili-
brium, then x is also an endpoint of B(T u{(i,h)}) and the algorithm
follows this line segment by increasing the complementary variable
Aih
from zero.
In this way the algorithm generates by a sequence of complementary pivot
steps the piecewise linear path P from v to a Nash-equilibrium. By a sim-
ple combinatorial argument it can be shown that the algorithm never cycles
and always converges to a Nssh equilibrium.
Let us apply the algorithm to the example presented earlier (see
Figure 3.1.). At v for the solution
(b',u1.H2.~1.~2) of (3.8) holds that
A1 -(A~2)1 - 2. P2 -(BT~1)2 - 8. R12 - R1 -(Av2)2 - 2- 1~ 1, p.21 L
~2 -(BTVl)1 - 8-~} -~, while b' - 0. The algorithm leaves v by in-
creasing b' from zero. At a we have that b' - 1, g-(Aa )- 16 ~ -
9 1 2 1 9' 2
(BTal)2 -?9, ~12 - 9 while k21 becomes zero. Thus at a the complementary
variable of }t21, i.e. ~21, is increased from zero. The solution at c is
pl - (Ac2)1 - i9. P2 - (BTC1)1 - (BTC1)2 - ?9. u12 - P1 -
(Ac2)2 - 9' ~21
- b' and b' - 9. Then we are in case (iii), i.e., ~22 becomes zero. In13
systom I?,R1; (2.k~) becomes ( 2,1) and the algorithm continues by increas- - c
ing
u22
from zero. In the next step the algorithm reaches the Nash equili-
brium (( 1,0),(1,0)) at which b' - 1(case (i)).
We conclude this section by providing a game theoretic interpreta-
tion of the path generated by the procedure. The basic feature is that
probabilities related to strategies not being optimal for a plsyer are
kept relatively ( to v) minimal. At the starting vector v we have zll(v) )
z12(v) while z21(v) ~ z22(v). Thus at v strategy ( 1,1) is the best reply
for player 1 while strategy ( 2,2) is best for player 2. Now the algorithm
increases from v the probabilities with which these strategies are played
whereas the other probabilities are all decreased. The algoríthm continues
in this way till i t generates the strategy vector a at which player 2
becomes in equilibrium ( z21(e) - z22(a)). From a the algorithm generates
strategy vectors x by relatively increasing probability x21 away from
x12
while keeping player 2 in equilibrium. When strategy vector c is reached,
the probability with which player 2 plays his second strategy has become
relatively equal to c12. Then the algorithm distorts the equilibrium situ-
ation of player 2. It continues by making for player 2 the strategy (2,2)
less profitable than (2,1), i.e. z22(x) is made smaller than z21(x). Mean-
while, the probabilities x12 and x22 are kept relatively equal to each
other and relatively smaller than xll and x21. In this way the Nash equi-
librium (( 1,0),(1,0)) is reached.
4. Properties of the eguilibrium found bv the algorithm
In this section we discuss whether something can be said about
game theoretic properties holding for the equilibrium found by our algo-
rithm. More concrete, we would like to know whether the equilibrium found
is isolated, quasi-strong, regular, essential, perfect, or proper. The
precise definition of these concepts can be found for example in van Damme
[2]. It turns out that we can only state that our algorithm finds a per-
fect equilibrium whenever it starts from an interior strategy vector.
Other properties do not hold in general for the equilibrium reached by our
procedure. The latter can easily be verified by applying our algorithm to
simple examples.14
Thus positive result is that our algorithm finds a perfect equilibrium
whenever the starting point v is in the inner of the sirate~y é~pácc, i.e.
vjk ) 0 for all (j,k) E I. This is interesting the more because for bi-
matrix games an equilibrium is perfect iff it is undominated ( see Theorem
3.2.2 in [2]). To prove the statement it is most convenient to define a
perfect equilibrium as a limit point of a sequence of E-perfect equili-
bria. Thus first we have to define E-perfectness.
Definition 4.1. The strategy vector x(E) E S is an E-perfect equilibrium
if it is completely mixed and satisfies:
if zjk(x(E)) ( zj~(x(E)) then xjk(E) s E, vj,k,,l.
Observe that an E-perfect equilibrium need not to be a Nash-equilibrium.
The concept only states that non-optimal pure reply strategies are played
with a small probability, i.e. players make only small mistakes. Now x' in
S is a perfect equilibrium if x' is a limit point of a sequence {x(E)}
E.~O ~
where for all E, x(E) is an E-perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2. If v lies in the interior of S then the algorithm finds a
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. From Section 3 we know that vectors x on the path generated by the
elgorithm satisfy
xjk - b(x,v).vjk if zjk(x) C max~ zj~(x)
xjk 2 b(x,v).vjk if zjk(x) - max~ zj~(x),
where 0 5 b(x,v) :- min {xih I v. ~ 0} 5 1.
(i,h) ~ih
lh
Observe that all Nash equilibria x' in the inner of S are perfect because
then zjk(x') - max~zj~(x') for all (j,k) E I. Because vjk ~ 0 for sll
(j,k) E I, the algorithm can only reach an equilibrium x' on the boundary
of S if b(x.v) decreases in the last iteration of the algorithm down to
zero. Suppose b(x,v) decreases along the line segment [y,x'] from b(y,v)
to zero. We define I(x') :- {(j,k) E I~x~k - 0} and (r,~) the index for15
which
yr~i - m~(i,p)EI(xM)yip' Now each vector x on [y,x') is an E-perfect
equilibrium x(E) with e- xr~. The limit point x~ oï {x(e)rE I0 is pel'lact
y
by definition. o
Observe that we not only proved that our algorithm finds a perfect
equilibrium but also that the last linear piece of the path consists of e-
perfect equilibria.
5. How to find more equilibria?
Both our algorithm and the Lemke-Howson procedure are complementa-
ry pivoting algorithms and therefore find positively indexed equilibria.
The notion of the index of an equilibrium in a bi-matrix game is intro-
duced by Shapley [5]. The index of an equilibrium is positive or negative
depending on the sign of the determinant of a matrix related to the payoff
structure at that equilibrium. For more details we refer the reader to
[5]. In principle our algorithm can find all positively indexed equili-
bria. This because our procedure can start from almost all strategy vec-
tors. Because the Lemke-Howson method can only start from a limited number
of strategy vectors, it is possible that this procedure cannot detect some
of the positively indexed equilibria. We illustrate this with an example
given by Shapley in the article mentioned. Furthermore, we show that our
algorithm can also find negatively indexed equilibria by restarting in a
positively indexed equilibrium already found. This can only be done for
games with an odd number of isolated equilibria, so that the number of
negatively indexed equilibria is one less than the number of positively
indexed equilibria (see [5]). This is not a great restriction because the
set of bi-matrix games having these properties is dense in the set of all
bi-matrix games (see [2]). We conclude this section with some remarks on
the computational performance of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and our proce-
dure.
Before giving the example of Shapley we first give a rough impres-
sion of the Lemke-Howson procedure. It solves a bi-matrix game (n1,n2,A,B)
nl~n2 by solving a related linear complementarity problem on R . Any vector
nl'n2
y- (yi,y2)
in R} corresponds to s strategy vector x-(xi,x2) in S,
n.
where xj - yj(E~~lyj~)-1, j- 1,2. By this transformation we can indicate16
how the Lemke-Howson procedure operates on the strategy space S. It starts
from a pure strategy vector at which piayer i piuys a~pecific p~~re ctra-
tegy while player 2 plays his best reply against that strategy. If this
vector is not a Nash equilibrium, the algorithm starts with increasing the
probability related to the best reply strategy of player 1 against the
starting strategy of player 2. In this way, the Lemke-Howson method fol-
lows the best reply set of player 2 till it reaches a Nash equilibrium.
Note that the starting vector is related to one of the pure strategies of
player 1. By interchanging the players the maximal number of different
starting vectors equals
ni}n2.
The example of Shapley concerns a 3X3 bi-matrix game with payoff
matrices
r0 3 0l r0 2 3
A- IL2 2 OJ
and B- j3 2 0 .
3 0 1 LO 0 1]
Observe that the payoff structure for both players is identical. This game
possesses two positively indexed Nash equilibria, i.c. ((0,0,1),(0,0,1))
~d ((3'3'0}'(3'3'0)).
However, the Lemke-Howson algorithm can only find
the first one. This because that method can only start in one of the three
vectors ((1,0,0),(0,0,1)), ((0,1,0),(1,0,0)) and ((0,0,1),(0,0,1)), each
corresponding to a pure strategy of player 1 and the best reply of 2. Of
course, interchanging the players gives no additional starting vectors
because the payoffs are equal for both players.
With our algorithm we can also find the second positively indexed
Nash equilibrium. For example, when it starts from v-((0,1,0),(0,1,0)),
it reaches ((3,3,0},(3,3,0)) in one step. This because z(v) -((3,2,0),
(3,2,0)), making that the algorithm generates from v a path of vectors x
with xjl 2 vji, xj2 5 v~2 and xj3 - 0, j- 1,2.
Next, we indicate how to find negatively indexed equilibria with
our algorithm. We recall from Section 3 that our algorithm generates from
a starting vector v a piecewise linear path of vectors x in S satisfying
xjk 2 b(x,v).vjk if zjk(x) - maxhzjh(x)
xjk - b(x,v).vjk if zjk(x) ( maxhzjh(x),17
whPre 0 5 b(x.v) - min {Xlhlv,~ ~ 0} 5 1.
(i,h) ~ih 11
Observe that these vectors all lie in the set Bv :- u,1,Bv(T), T~ I, where
Bv(T) -{x E S~xjk 2 b(x,v).v~k and zjk(x) - maxhzjh(x), (j,k) E T
x~k - b(x,v).v~k and zjk(x) ~ maxhzjh(x), (j,k) a T}.
In general the set Bv is a 1-dimensional manifold. More precisely, it
consists of disjoint piecewise linear paths. One such path connects v and
a positively indexed Nash equilibrium while all other paths connect two
Nash equilibria, one positively and one negatively indexed. In this way
all other equilibria are connected.
How can we use the set Bv to find negatively indexed Nash equili-
bria? Suppose we have found k different positively indexed Nash equilibria
by starting our algorithm from k different starting vectors. Next we con-
sider the set Bv related to the starting vector v from which the first
Nash equilibrium was found. In that set we successively restart our algo-
rithm from the other k-1 positively indexed equilibria and find k-1 diffe-
rent negatively indexed equilibria by following the piecewise linear paths
connecting the equilibria with positive and negative index. That this path
is generated by our algorithm follows from the fact that vectors on the
path satisfy the conditions (3.1). The only additional step is the initia-
lization of the algorithm at a positively indexed equilibrium x~. In prac-
tice this can be done by substituting v for the starting vector v~ related
to x` in the final system of the algorithm starting from v~.
Again we illustrate this with the example of Section 3. Consider
Figure 5.1. When we apply our algorithm starting from vl we find ((1,0),
(1,0)). Next we apply the algorithm from v3 and find ((0,1),(0,1)). The
third (negatively indexed) equilibrium is found by restarting the algo-
rithm in ((0,1),(0,1)) while considering vl as stsrting vector in the
system. Thus, in the Final system related to ((0,1),(0,1)) with v- v3 we
have to substitute vl for v3. Applying the algorithm in this manner means
that we reach ((9,9),(8,8)) by traversing the piecewise linear path in B 1














Figure 5.1. The set B 1 consists of a linear path connecting vl and
v
((1,0),(1,0)) and a piecewise linear path connecting ((0,1),(0,1)) and x'.
The line segment connecting ((0,1),(0,1)) and a lies on the line through
vl and ((0,1),(0,1)) and equals B 1({(1,2), (2,2)}). Furthermore, the line
v
segment [a,x'] equals B 1({(1,2),(2,1),(2,2)}).
v
To compare the computational strength of our algorithm and the
Lemke-Howson procedure we applied both algorithms to several games of
different dimension. More precisely, the number of actions of both players
varied from 4 to 16. The computational speed was measured in the number of
pivot steps needed to obtain an equilibrium. Overall seen, the Lemke-
Howson method performs best. In particular that method is in favour for
games of small dimension and games in which the number of actions of one
player is small compared to the other. The Lemke-Howson method then ope-
rates on the best reply set of the player having the least number of ac-
tions. Our method is more suited for relatively large games with both
players having a more or less equal number of actions. The reason is that
our algorithm adapts all probabilities simultaneously. Of course, the19
choice of the starting strategy vector is crucial for our algorithm. In
general it seems impossible to select a'best' starting vector from the
data. We also did experiments with starting vectors related to rationaliz-
able strategies (see [1] and [4]). At those starting vectors only actions
are played that are a best reply against an action played by the other
player. However, the results show no better results than those obtained
for starting vectors at which all strategies are played with equal proba-
bility.
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